In this paper, the interplay between a class of nonlinear estimators and strategic sensors is studied in several participatorysensing scenarios. It is shown that for the class of estimators, if the strategic sensors have access to noiseless measurements of the to-be-estimated-variable, truth-telling is an equilibrium of the game that models the interplay between the sensors and the estimator. Furthermore, performance of the proposed estimators is examined in the case that the strategic sensors form coalitions and in the presence of noise.
estimator. The fact that median is robust in the presence of noisy and corrupted data is well known, e.g. see [7] . However, to the best of our knowledge, the benefits of using a median estimator in the presence of strategic sensors and in a game-theoretic framework has not been formalized in the literature.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows. First, two linear estimators are considered and it is shown that sensors engaging in a truth-telling behaviour, i.e. reporting the correct variable that the participatory-sensing scheme wishes to estimate, does not correspond to an equilibrium of the game modelling the interaction between the sensors and the estimator. Next, it is demonstrated that for a class of nonlinear estimators truth-telling is in fact an equilibrium of this game. Third, the scenarios where strategic sensors might be colluding and form coalitions is studied. Particularly, the link between the size of the coalitions and the performance of the estimators in the aforementioned class is established. Fourth, the case where the measurements carried out by the sensors are noisy is studied.
Many participatory-sensing mechanisms adopt quality assessment procedures and provide appropriate incentives to extract useful data. In this paper, however, we show that even if the participatory-sensing services do not adopt quality-assessment procedures or provide incentives, they can shape the behaviour of strategic sensors to elicit a truthful message. This is certainly a favourable approach as (i) there is no need for incentives (in either monetary or psychological forms) in the often large groups of recruited participants and (ii) it further reduces the complexity of the employed estimators.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we investigate the interplay between the strategic sensors and the linear as well as nonlinear estimators. Section III extends these results to the case where the sensors can form coalitions. In Section IV, we study nonlinear estimators when the sensors are noisy. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. NOISELESS MEASUREMENTS
Let us consider the case where a receiver is interested in measuring the variable x ∈ R. Hence, it employs n > 1 sensors to measure this variable and report it back. Each sensor transmits a measurement y i ∈ R. We assume that the transmissions occur simultaneously and, thus, the sensors do not have access to the messages communicated by each other. The receiver subsequently uses these messages to construct an estimate of x, denoted byx ∈ R. The receiver wants to guarantee that the estimation error E{ x −x 2 } is small, where E{·} denotes the expectation of its argument. In this section, we assume that the sensors have access to the noiseless measurements of x. However, their interests are not aligned with that of the receiver and each other, that is, sensor i ∈ n wishes to minimize the cost E{ (x + θ i ) −x 2 }, where θ i ∈ R is its private information (i.e., it is not known by the other sensors and the receiver). Here, n denotes the set {1, . . . , n}. ASSUMPTION 2.1: x and (θ i ) i∈ n are jointly distributed Gaussian random variables with zero mean.
We are interested in large groups of homogeneous sensors to mimic the behaviour of large crowds. Therefore, we make the following assumption. ASSUMPTION 2.2: (θ i ) i∈ n are identically and independently distributed random variables. Moreover, x and θ i are independent for all i ∈ n .
Let g i (·|x, θ i ) denote the conditional distribution that sensor i uses for generating its message y i (i.e., its policy). Therefore, for any Lebesgue-measurable set Y i ⊆ R, we get
We use the notation G i to denote the set of all such conditional distributions for each sensor i. Moreover, since the dimension of the messages for all the sensors is the same, G 1 = · · · = G n = G. Let us define a cost for sensor i ∈ n as
where (g i ) i∈ n ∈ G n is the policy of all the sensors, π : R n → R is the policy of the receiver, i.e.,x = π((y i ) i∈ n ), and p x and p θ are probability density functions. Note that this is an ex ante cost function as the sensors do not wait until they receive their private information and the state measurement in forming the cost function (it leads to a setup in which the sensors select their policies before entering the game). Hence, at the equilibrium induced by this cost function, the parameters of the policy are not a function of the private information and the state measurement, however, the transmitted message can be a function of these measurements 2 . Alternatively, we can form an ex post cost function
The tuple constitutes an ex post π-Stackelberg equilibrium if
In statements where we do not distinguish between ex ante and ex post equilibria, the statement holds in both senses.
Note that π, in π-Stackelberg equilibrium, is a generic place-holder for an arbitrary policy π and indicates that the equilibrium corresponds to this policy.
In this paper, our interest is to find an estimator π that can extract useful information from strategic sensors. This is motivated by the observation that, for linear estimators, the quality of the estimation degrades as the number of participating sensors increases [6] . Let us start with a simple, yet widely used, linear estimator to illustrate the problem.
DEFINITION 2 (AVERAGING ESTIMATOR):
The receiver employs the estimator
A tuple of conditional distributions ((g * i ) i∈ n ) ∈ G n constitutes an ex ante (ex post) equilibrium for the averaging estimator if it is an ex ante (ex post) ψ-Stackelberg equilibrium.
DEFINITION 3 (TRUTH-TELLING PORTFOLIO): Sensor i follows the truth-telling strategy if
δ is the Dirac delta distribution 4 . The truth-telling portfolio is a tuple of conditional distributions such that all the sensors are employing the truth-telling strategy. Now, we can prove the following negative result regarding the averaging estimator. 2 Using an ex ante optimal policy can be motivated by the lack of enough computational resources for online calculation of the policy based on the realization of the private information and the state. 3 This is the same as saying P{y i = x} = 1. 4 The Dirac delta distribution is a mapping δ : R → R ∪ {±∞} such that δ(t) = 0 for all t ∈ R \ {0} and
THEOREM 4: The truth-telling portfolio is not an equilibrium for the averaging estimator.
Proof: Let all the players except player i ∈ n employ the truth-telling strategy. Therefore, y j = x for all j ∈ n \ {i}.
Hence, we havex = (1 − 1/n)x + (1/n)y i . Now, sensor i using the policy
and E{ (x + θ i ) −x 2 } = 0, which is strictly less than, respectively, substitution of the truth-telling strategy in both ex post and ex ante cost functions.
Even with the optimal linear estimator E{x | y 1 , . . . , y n }, it was observed in [6] that the truth-telling is not an equilibrium of the game and that, at the equilibrium, the quality of the estimation degrades as the number of sensors increases. In limit, no information can be recovered from the transmitted messages. This observation, together with Theorem 4, motivates us to find estimators for which the truth-telling portfolio is an equilibrium. We address this concern in the remainder of this section.
DEFINITION 5 (2 -REJECTION AVERAGING ESTIMATOR): Assume that n ≥ 2 + 1. Let (i j ) j∈ n be given such that y i1 ≤ y i2 ≤ · · · ≤ y in . The receiver employs the estimator
A tuple of conditional distributions ((g * i ) i∈ n ) ∈ G n constitutes an ex ante (ex post) equilibrium for the 2 -rejection averaging estimator if it is an ex ante (ex post) ψ -Stackelberg equilibrium. THEOREM 6: The truth-telling is an equilibrium for the 2 -rejection averaging estimator for all ∈ (n − 1)/2 .
Proof: Let all the players except player i ∈ n employ the truth-telling strategy. Therefore, y j = x, ∀j ∈ n \ {i}.
Hence, we havex = x irrespective of y i (as it will be rejected). Thus, truth-telling (among all the other policies) minimizes the cost of sensor i in both ex ante and ex post senses.
DEFINITION 7 (MEDIAN ESTIMATOR)
: Let (i j ) j∈ n be given such that y i1 ≤ y i2 ≤ · · · ≤ y in . The receiver employs the
where E and O represent the sets of even and odd integers, respectively. A tuple of conditional distributions ((g * i ) i∈ n ) ∈ G n constitutes an ex ante (ex post) equilibrium for the median estimator if it is an ex ante (ex post) φ-Stackelberg equilibrium.
LEMMA 8: The median estimator is equivalent to the 2 -rejection averaging estimator if = (n − 2)/2 for n ∈ E and = (n − 1)/2 for n ∈ O.
Proof: The proof follows from simple algebraic manipulations and is hence omitted.
COROLLARY 9: The truth-telling is an equilibrium for the median estimator.
So far, we have assumed that the sensors do not form coalitions to deceive the receiver. In the next section, we define a different game in which sensors can act together.
III. EXTENSION TO COALITIONS
Assume that sensor i ∈ n can submit c i ∈ N messages instead of one. This setup has two interpretations. First, each sensor represents a coalition of size c i instead of a single sensor. Alternatively, we can assume that each sensor represents an array of sensors introduced by a single hacker. Therefore, the receiver has access to (y i ) i∈ c where c = j∈ n c j . The receiver does not know (c j ) j∈ n . Here, the definition of the 2 -rejection averaging estimator is the same as in Definition 5 with c denoting the number of messages instead of n.
Examples of participatory-sensing services that admit coalitions are legislative bodies, e.g. the U.S. congress, and truthfinding committees, e.g. royal commissions in most of the Commonwealth countries. Here, the coalitions are political parties because their members most often, persuaded by the party whip, vote on party lines. Therefore, it would be nice to construct estimators that can recover the truth despite the ever-growing partisanship.
THEOREM 10: Let j∈ n \{i} c j ≥ c i + 1 for all i ∈ n . The truth-telling is an equilibrium for the 2 -rejection averaging estimator if max i∈ n c i ≤ ≤ ( j∈ n c j − 1)/2 .
Proof:
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 6 and is hence omitted.
REMARK 3.1: Theorem 10 shows that, for a given , the estimator is robust to admitting a coalition of sensors with the size of, at most, assuming that no coalition has more sensors than the sum of the size of all other coalitions minus one (i.e., there is a balance of power between the competing coalitions).
COROLLARY 11: Let
The truth-telling portfolio is an equilibrium for the median estimator.
REMARK 3.2: Corollary 11 shows that the truth-telling portfolio is an equilibrium if no individual coalition has the majority.
Thus, the median estimator is extremely robust to manipulation by strategic entities even if they cooperate. This observation has interesting implications in politics, that is, any truth finding committee, as a whole, can only recover the truth so long as no single party has the majority because, in such case, they can silence the voice of the others.
IV. EXTENSION TO NOISY MEASUREMENTS
Consider the case where sensor i ∈ n has access to noisy measurements of the state denoted by z i = x + w i , where (w i ) i∈ n are independent zero-mean Gaussian random variables. Similarly, sensor i uses the conditional distribution g i (·|z i , θ i ) to generate its message y i . In this case, we say that sensor i follows the truth-telling strategy if
Unfortunately, access to noisy measurements destroys the truth-telling property of the median estimator.
THEOREM 12: The truth-telling portfolio is not an equilibrium for the 2 -rejection estimator in the presence of noise.
Proof: Let us pick a sensor k ∈ n . Set y j = z j for all j ∈ n \ {k}. Assume that
j=1 be given such that i j = k for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 and y i1 ≤ y i2 ≤ · · · ≤ y in−1 . Note that k ∈ { + 1, . . . , n − } with a positive probability. In that case, we havex = 1/(n − 2 ) n− j= +1 y ij . This results in a cost equal to E{ (x + θ k ) − x 2 |z k , θ k , y 1 , . . . , y n } = E{ x − 1/(n − 2 ) n− j= +1 z ij 2 |z k , θ k , y 1 , . . . , y n } which is strictly smaller than sensor k's cost had it been truthful: E{ (x + θ k ) − 1/(n − 2 ) n− j= +1 z ij 2 |z k , θ k , y 1 , . . . , y n }. Hence, by taking expectation of these terms over y 1 , . . . , y n , we can show that the cost of sensor k can be reduced by not acting truthfully. This concludes the proof.
A similar result can be proved for the median estimator.
THEOREM 13: The truth-telling portfolio is not an equilibrium for the median estimator in the presence of noise.
Proof: Let n ∈ O as, with a similar idea, we can prove the result for n ∈ E. Pick a sensor k ∈ n . Let (i j ) n−1 j=1 be given such that i j = k for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 and y i1 ≤ y i2 ≤ · · · ≤ y in−1 . Hence, we havê
This gives
This results in a strictly smaller cost than using a truthful strategy since y i (n−1)/2 ≤ z k + θ k ≤ y i (n+1)/2 occurs with a positive probability. This concludes the proof.
Although truth-telling is no longer an equilibrium, we can characterize another equilibrium that can reveal some information about the to-be-estimated-variable.
REMARK 4.1: Notice that, without loss of generality, we can consider an odd number of measurements because we can always transform an even number of measurements into an odd number by either discarding a measurement randomly or by introducing a very large or a very small measurement (that always gets discarded).
is an equilibrium for the median estimator in the presence of noise.
Proof: Following the same line of reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 13, selecting y k = z k + θ k is the best response of each sensor irrespective of the others in both ex ante and ex post senses. REMARK 4.2: It is interesting to note that reporting y k = z k + θ k is a dominant strategy, i.e., it is in the benefit of players irrespective of other reports (when the players do not form collations). Therefore, even if some sensors are randomly-behaving or faulty, the rational ones report z k + θ k . REMARK 4.3: The captured equilibrium in Theorem 14 is not unique. This can be observed from the fact that the sensors can employ any stochastic or deterministic mappings for constructing their messages y k when it is very large or very small, since the message will be discarded regardless and has no impact on the outcome of the estimation.
PROPOSITION 15: The equilibrium in Theorem 14 results in lim m→∞,n=2m+1 E{ x − φ((y i ) i∈ n ) 2 } = 0.
Proof: At the equilibrium, we have
From [9] , we know that lim m→∞,n=2m+1 φ((w i + θ i ) i∈ n ) = 0, a.s. This concludes the proof. EXAMPLE 1: Consider an estimation problem in which V xx = 1, V θiθi = 1, and V wiwi = 0.1 for all i where V xx , V θiθi , and V wiwi are the variances of x, θ i , and w i , respectively. When using the median estimator, at the equilibrium in Theorem 14, the sensors report y i = z i + θ i , ∀i. The blue curve in Fig. 1 shows the estimation error E{ x − φ((y i ) i∈ n ) 2 } approximated using 10000 random samples. If, for the signals transmitted at this specific equilibrium, we were to use the averaging estimator, the estimation error would follow the red curve in Fig. 1 , which is certainly smaller. This degradation in the performance is the price of robustness. One way to capitalize on this difference is to lie to the players that the utilized estimator is the median one but use an averaging policy and, hence, nudge them towards a good behaviour (from the perspective of the estimator) [10] . Note that this is applicable if the players cannot infer the correct mechanism by experimenting, e.g., when the players interact with a given participatory-sensing scheme very infrequently. ♦
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the problem of designing participatory-sensing mechanisms is considered. Particularly, it is shown that for a class of nonlinear estimators, truth telling is an equilibrium of game modelling the interaction between the sensors and the estimator. Later, it is established, for the case where the sensors collude and form coalitions that are no lager than half of the total participants, that there is always an estimator, specifically the median estimator, which results in truth telling being an equilibrium. Future research can focus on dynamic estimation problems.
